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Deepening democratization in Brazil has coincided with sustained flows of domestic migration. 
This raises an important question of whether migration deepens or depresses democratic 
development in migrant-sending regions. Whereas earlier perspectives view migration as a 
political "brain drain," we contend that out-migration can generate resources that promote 
democratic processes back home. We investigate the role of migration in two aspects of 
democratization: electoral participation and competition. The analyses are based on spatial panel 
data models of mayoral election results across all municipalities between 1996 and 2012. The 
results show that migration increases electoral participation and competition in migrant-sending 
localities in Brazil. This study also identifies the sociopolitical context that conditions the impact 
of migration: the effect is most often present in the context of rural-urban migration and is more 
pronounced in sending localities with less democratic political structures than those with more 
democratic structures. Moreover, using spatial network models, we find evidence for the 
transmission of political remittances from migration destination municipalities to origin 
municipalities. The present study extends the research on the "migration-development nexus" to 
the political arena, thus demonstrating the value of integrating demographic processes into 









The past few decades have witnessed deepening democratization in Brazil. This has coincided 
with sustained flows of domestic migration in the country, especially from rural to urban areas. 
The country now has one of the highest rates of internal migration in the developing world, with 
two-fifths of the population living outside of their place of birth (United Nations 2013). This 
raises an interesting question about the relationship between the two phenomena: Does out-
migration deepen or depress the democratization process? The present study examines how out-
migration affects electoral outcomes in migrant-sending localities. In doing so, it moves beyond 
the conventional focus of demography from how political factors shape demographic outcomes 
to the reverse question: how demographic forces shape political processes, a question key to the 
growing field of "political demography" (Goldstone et al. 2012). 
Charting new directions and investigating new questions can advance the field of 
demography and make it even more relevant to ongoing political debates. Demography is a 
general science and engages in important questions related to both the causes and consequences 
of population change. In this respect, the study of the consequences (economic, social, as well as 
political) of demographic change is at the core of the discipline. While the economic and social 
impacts of demographic processes (e.g., migration) have received ample attention, research 
aiming to uncover the political impacts of migration has lagged far behind. Fortunately, the 
emergent field of political demography has conceptualized a bi-directional relationship between 
population and political processes although empirical studies have only recently begun to follow 
suit. Our research is one of the first efforts to examine the impact of migration on electoral 
politics (and, to the best of our knowledge, the first in Brazil to do so).  
Earlier perspectives have viewed migration as a source of a political "brain drain," in that 
out-migration can deplete the political vitality of sending areas and delay the democratization 
process (Hirschman et al. 1999; Kurtz 2004). However, with the advent of modern 
communication and transportation technologies, today's migrants are more circular and better 
positioned to maintain social and economic links with families and communities from their 
places of origin (Itzigsohn and Giourguli 2002; Kapur 2010; Levitt 2001). This linkage facilitates 
cross-space democratic diffusion and financial transfers, which can nurture democratic behaviors 
and reshape local patronage systems in sending societies (Lu 2019; Pfutze 2014). The possibility 
for migration to influencing politics back home is relevant for internal migrants, who are better 
positioned to conduct timely interactions with remaining families and make frequent return 
visits. In this paper, we jointly consider these multiple pathways that underlie the overall political 
impact of migration. 
Brazil provides a useful setting for investigating the political consequences of migration 
because over the past several decades, the country has experienced substantial migration while 
simultaneously undergoing a democratic transition. After a 21-year military regime, the 
transition to democracy began in 1985 and was consolidated in 1988 with a new Constitution and 
unrestricted direct elections at the national and subnational levels (Cajado et al. 2014). In 1989, 
the proportion of eligible voters surpassed half of the total population for the first time in the 
republican history of Brazil (Moisés 1993). Despite the progress, corruption and clientelism have 
endured as features of Brazilian politics (Ferraz and Finan 2005; Frey 2019; Gay 1998; Samuels 
2001). The development of well-functioning democratic institutions is a process that is still 
underway. 
In the present paper, we operationalize democratization using measures of electoral 
participation and competition (Przeworski et al. 2000; Vanhanen 2003). Because voting remains 
an essential political activity in democratic societies, the degree of participation and competition 
is a crucial indicator of the health and functioning of a democracy (Franklin 1999). We compiled 
panel data on municipal-level migration, socioeconomic indicators, and mayoral election results 




Brazil are largely operated by local political machines (Ames 1994). Since the passing of the 
new constitution of 1988, municipal governments have been responsible for implementing public 
policies and control a large share of public resources that can be allocated for clientelistic use 
(Ferraz and Finan 2005; Rocha and Kerbauy 2014). Also, mayors play a major role in the 
Brazilian political structure as they act as brokers for party leaders at higher levels of 
government (Stokes et al. 2013). For these reasons, recent studies on clientelism in Brazil have 
focused on mayoral governments (Avis et al. 2018; Frey 2019). 
 
Internal Migration in Brazil 
Brazil is characterized by massive regional inequalities and internal migration. Inequality 
between rural and urban localities is especially pronounced, with rural poverty rates doubling 
those of urban areas (Gori Maia and Buainain 2011). This uneven development has led to large-
scale migration from rural areas, resulting in the share of rural population plummeting from 55% 
in 1960 to 32% in 1980 to 15% in 2010 (IBGE 2018). Internal migration had traditionally flowed 
to large metropolitan areas, notably in the states of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Overtime, it 
has increasingly been directed to new areas of agricultural development in the North and Central-
West (Camarano and Abramovay 1999; Perz 2000).  
Despite somewhat of a recent decline, the volume of internal migrants in Brazil has 
remained significant: nearly 12 million people migrated between 2004-2009 (Dota and Queiroz 
2019). Migration continues to be dominated by rural-urban migration (Gori Maia and Buainain 
2015) although the traditional northeast-southeast flow (from the poorest to the richest regions) 
has been superseded by new, more complex migration flows (Baeninger 2012). In addition, the 
deconcentration of production and urbanization in intermediary cities has mitigated the 
polarization of employment distribution in recent decades (de Carvalho and Charles-Edwards 
2019). New employment opportunities in small and medium-sized cities, coupled with the high 
costs of living in large metropolitan areas, have increased intraregional migration and shortened 
the average distance travelled (Baeninger 2012). Migrants nowadays are more likely than before 
to stay within the state and less likely to stay permanently in destination localities (Baptista and 
Rigotti 2017).  
In the midst of this transition, migrants often maintain continuous connections with 
relatives and peers in their places of origin (Fazito 2010). We can see evidence of this from the 
growing rate of return migration, which accounts for almost one quarter of all internal migration 
(IBGE 2010). But the sociopolitical impact of internal migration and its recent trends are not 
well understood. To the best of our knowledge, no study has empirically investigated the impact 
of internal migration on political development in Brazil. Most existing studies have emphasized 
how migration is linked to regional economic cycles, the spatial distribution of employment, and 
socioeconomic development (Cunha 2015; Genicot et al. 2017; Lima and Braga 2016; Pais et al. 
2018). Our study seeks to fill this gap and examine how migration flows may shape democratic 
processes back home. 
 
Mechanisms Linking Migration and Democratization  
Migration can influence democratic processes in sending communities through several main 
channels. The first is political remittances: migrants learn the political values and behavior of 
their host localities, which often have more democratic political environments than their places 
of origin, and transmit them back to their communities of origin through long-distance 
communication and return visits (Kapur 2014; Pfutze 2012). Migrants’ transmission of 
democratic norms and practices promotes political consciousness and ultimately contributes to 
democratic behaviors in sending areas (Lu et al. 2017; Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow 2010). This 
transmission of political remittances can occur through both close social networks and 




influenced by their interpersonal interactions with current or returned migrant family members or 
friends. In the latter case, political remittances produce an aggregated effect through community-
wide diffusion in a way that transcends individuals who have direct ties to migrants. 
In Brazil, regional distinctions in political institutions serve as a basis for political 
remittances. For instance, the term Coronelismo (literally “rule by the coronel”) exemplifies the 
highly oligarchic and personalized political structures that have traditionally dominated politics 
in rural areas and the poorest North and Northeast regions (Goldsmith and Wilson 1991; 
Roninger 1987). The coronels1 have traditionally controlled strategic resources such as land, 
communication networks, and public resources. In rural and poor areas, the coronelismo has 
largely persisted and has even evolved into rampant clientelism, subsequently impairing 
democratic institutions and norms (de Carvalho 1997; Frey 2019). In the most developed urban 
areas, which are largely concentrated in the South and Southeastern regions, European 
immigrants brought new liberal ideologies from the time of the late nineteenth century. By the 
end of the twentieth century, industrialization had fueled the development of more liberal and 
democratic institutions and undermined the ability of local politicians to monopolize strategic 
resources and votes (Baiardi 1995; Gay 1998).   
The second mechanism of the migration effect operates through economic remittances. 
Economic remittances can ease a household’s capital constraints; they can also have important 
multiplier effects on the local economy by increasing consumption and creating job opportunities 
(Durand et al. 1996). Importantly, the flow of these resources may undermine local clientelistic 
relations by strengthening the power of ordinary citizens relative to political actors. Clientelism 
entails the distribution of material rewards and benefits by political actors to constituents in 
exchange for electoral support (Greene 2007; Stokes et al. 2013). Economic remittances 
effectively reduce citizens’ dependence on clientelistic transfers. To remain appealing, 
clientelistic transfers would have to increase in magnitude, which may become prohibitively 
expensive (Pfutze 2014). As a result, citizens with alternative income from remittances may be 
emboldened to "make ideological investments in democratization" (Magaloni and Kricheli 2010) 
by voting in accordance with their true partisan preferences. This alters the distribution of votes. 
Instead of being limited to established power brokers (e.g., incumbent parties), votes are 
increasingly cast for a multitude of political actors (i.e., opposition parties), thereby increasing 
electoral competition. 
The potential of migration and remittances to weaken local clientelism is relevant in 
Brazil, where clientelistic transactions have remained entrenched despite increasingly 
competitive elections. Between 1964 and 1985, the military regime imposed a two-party system 
in Brazil, composed of a pro-government party (ARENA) and an opposition party (MDB). After 
this period, a multiplicity of parties emerged and political fragmentation in local elections 
erupted in the 2000s when traditional parties, such as PMDB, PFL and PP lost ground to younger 
and smaller parties such as PT, PR, PPS, PSB and PSD (Lavareda and Telles 2016).  
Notwithstanding these changes, clientelism has continued to permeate Brazilian 
elections. Common clientelistic transactions include benefits such as cash, material goods 
(bricks, food, small appliances), and services such as health care or public-sector employment in 
exchange for political support (Sugiyama and Hunter 2013). About one third of voters declare 
that they know of some sort of vote buying (TSE 2015). Clientelism also extends to anti-poverty 
social policies, such as cash transfer programs, which account for over 25% of income for the 
rural poor (IICA 2012). Local incumbents may mislead voters by claiming that they will extend 
these programs and the opposition parties will end them. Politicians may also manipulate 
 
1 Coronel (colonel in English) refers to a locally dominant politician who provided favors in return for 




conditionalities of these programs in their favor such as by misreporting school attendance; this 
leads the penalized beneficiaries to blame and punish local incumbents (Brollo et al. 2017).  
The third channel is through the absence of migrants, which is likely to have an adverse 
effect on democratic outcomes. Emigration may produce a "political brain drain," whereby the 
absence of community members depletes human capital (e.g., the electorate) available for 
political participation (Docquier and Rapoport 2011). The loss is exacerbated if migrants are 
disproportionately selected among those who are most likely to engage in politics (Hirschman et 
al. 1999). The absence of migrants, especially those of high socioeconomic statuses, can also 
affect the supply of potential leaders for political changes in their places of origin (Kapur 2014). 
This may serve to relieve political tensions and maintain a hegemonic party structure in the 
places of origin.  
This is the case of internal migration in Brazil. Rural-urban migration is 
disproportionately drawn from the young and more educated residents (Gori Maia and Buainain 
2015). These groups are more likely to hold democratic values, to vote, and to engage in other 
political activities (Brooks 2014; Moisés 1993). These patterns suggest a potential detrimental 
impact of migration on electoral outcomes in sending communities. 
 
Working Hypotheses: How Does Migration Shape Electoral Outcomes in Brazil? 
Electoral Participation 
The mechanisms linking migration and democratization outlined above may shape electoral 
outcomes in several respects. The first is electoral participation, commonly operationalized by 
the rate of voter turnout (Fornos et al. 2004). The impact of migration on voter turnout in Brazil 
is not clear-cut. On the one hand, out-migration would be expected to reduce overall turnout, 
simply because voters are legally obliged to vote in Brazil. Brazil has the world’s largest 
electorate that is subject to compulsory voting (Birch 2008). Voting is mandatory for all literate 
citizens over 18 and under 70, and optional for citizens who are aged 16 and 17, older than 70, or 
illiterate (TSE 2018a). Despite these mandates, the abstention rates are not exactly low. For 
example, nearly 25 million voters (18% of the eligible voter population) did not vote in the 
municipal election of 2016 (TSE 2018b). Voters have to vote in the electoral section where they 
are officially registered (TSE 2018c). This means many migrants are unable to go to the polls 
where they are registered. Voters who are out of their electoral district must justify their 
abstentions at an official electoral office. An alternative for migrants is to transfer their 
registration to a new electoral district. But many migrants choose not to transfer their registration 
because of bureaucratic difficulties (TSE 2019). If voters abstain from voting for three 
consecutive elections, their registration is canceled. Citizens without a registration are unable to 
receive government services such as borrowing from government-owned financial institutions, 
obtaining a passport, and securing public employment. 
On the other hand, migrants may have a positive impact on the political participation of 
those left behind through their political remittances and economic remittances (Pérez-
Armendáriz and Crow 2010). This is particularly probable in Brazil for several reasons. For one 
thing, there is a high level of circular migration in the country (Baptista and Rigotti 2017). More 
than one quarter of internal migrants are considered short-term migrants, having stayed in the 
destination for less than 5 years (IBGE 2010). These migration patterns facilitate migrants' 
continuous interest in their communities of origin as well as close connections with the people 
left behind, thus boosting subsequent transfers of remittances. Also, as migrants may not be able 
to return home to vote but remain invested in their localities of origin, family members and 
friends who stay behind often act as their representatives in elections. Moreover, economic 
remittances can provide resources to help voters overcome physical constraints (e.g., distance, 





Hypothesis 1: Migration increases political participation among those left behind in 
sending communities, even though it may reduce the overall turnout rate. The positive impact of 
migration on political participation would manifest itself most clearly on those who are not 
obliged to vote, namely young voters (16-17 years) and the elderly (70 years or older). 
 
Electoral competition 
The second aspect of electoral outcome critical to this study is electoral competition. Elections in 
Brazil are often plagued by clientelism, which limits electoral competition and undermines the 
efficacy of electoral institutions. Voters in poor communities, many of which are also migrant-
sending communities, may be especially vulnerable to clientelistic practices (Epstein 2009). By 
contrast, migrants tend to move to more developed areas that have a more pluralistic party 
structure and greater democratic values. For example, in 2012, 72% of the 100 most densely 
populated municipalities (more developed and urban areas where the population exceeds 50,000 
people) had four or more candidates running for mayor; in comparison, only 15% of other 
municipalities in Brazil had this many candidates running for mayor (TSE 2018b). Also, a survey 
by the Corporación Latinobarómetro shows that Brazilians living in state capitals are more 
likely to support democracy than those in other localities (Corporación Latinobarómetro 2018). 
Through political remittances, migrants' exposure to a new political environment and adoption of 
more democratic values may positively influence electoral competition in sending localities.  
Furthermore, economic remittances from migrants increase the disposable income of the 
households that remain, which can subsequently erode clientelism and strengthen electoral 
competition. Economic remittances are an important source of income for many Brazilian 
households. About 3.4 million households received economic transfers from non-residents in 
2008 (5.8% of all households). Among these households, the average annual value of transfers 
was R$6,874 ($2,941), equaling 19% of total national household income (IBGE 2018). These 
remittances may be particularly crucial in supplementing income in the poorest sending 
localities. In such areas, the income of those who receive money from non-residents (including 
remittances) is 9% higher than those who do not (IBGE 2018).  
 
Hypothesis 2: Migration increases electoral competition in sending communities.  
 
Variations by origin and destination environment 
Socioeconomic differences as well as differences in democratic development between origin and 
destination localities may shape the impact of migration because they determine the level of 
migrants' political and economic remittances. We expect a larger impact when migrants move 
from less developed rural localities to more developed urban localities (and by extension, from 
less democratic environments to more democratic environments) than when migrants move 
between places with similar environments (between rural or between urban areas). Migrants in 
the former scenario tend to transmit a higher level of political and economic remittances than the 
latter. Also, people left behind in rural localities tend to be poorer and less educated, and are thus 
more likely to engage in clientelism. Both conditions mean that urban-bound migration has the 
greatest potential to promote participation and weaken clientelistic practices in rural localities. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The impact of migration on electoral outcomes is especially strong in the 
context of rural-to-urban migration. 
 
The impact of migration may also be stronger in localities with a lower level of 
democratic development. In this context, voters have been less exposed to democratic values and 
practices. They lack the basic political and economic resources to engage in politics as well as 




from migrants can transform individuals' political attitudes and behaviors. These remittances 
may have a more limited impact on localities with more democratic environments, especially 
when fair and competitive elections are already well established. 
 
Hypothesis 4: The impact of migration on electoral outcomes is stronger in origins with 
low levels of democratic development.  
 
Evidence for political remittances 
We have proposed three mechanisms that link migration to electoral outcomes in origin 
communities: i) political remittances; ii) economic remittances; and iii) absence. Our data do not 
provide direct information on political and economic remittances.2 The absence mechanism 
would manifest itself in a negative relationship between migration and the overall voter turnout 
rate. As for political remittances, we draw on rich electoral data across Brazil and make use of a 
novel empirical strategy to provide an indirect test for the presence of political remittances. 
Specifically, we examine the correlation between the electoral outcomes in the origin and 
destination localities. A high correlation would be suggestive of a transmission of political 
remittances.  
 
Hypothesis 5: There is a high correlation in electoral outcomes between origin and 
destination localities. 
 
Data, Variables and Methods 
Data 
Data on municipal-level migration flows and socioeconomic characteristics are from the 
Censuses of 1991, 2000 and 2010 (IBGE 2018). The municipality is the lowest administrative 
division in Brazil. In 1991 and 2000, two sample coverage rates were used in the Census: 10% of 
households in municipalities with more than 15,000 inhabitants and 20% in other municipalities. 
In 2010, five sample coverage rates were used, ranging from 5% in municipalities with more 
than 500,000 inhabitants to 50% in municipalities with no more than 2,500 inhabitants. On 
average, 11% of the households were interviewed in 2010. There were some changes in 
municipality boundaries between 1991 and 2010: the number of municipalities increased from 
4,491 in 1991 to 5,565 in 2010. Based on the methodology proposed by the Instituto de Pesquisa 
Econômica Aplicada (IPEA), we aggregated all municipalities into 4,267 Minimum Comparable 
Areas (MCAs), which represent common borders throughout the entire period of analysis (Ehrl 
2017), and are henceforth our units of analysis. 
MCAs are classified into urban and rural areas. Based on Veiga (2007), we define an 
MCA as rural when three criteria are met: i) the area is not located in any of the 35 metropolitan 
areas defined by the IBGE, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (Brazilian Institute of 
Geography and Statistics); ii) the area had a 2010 population size of lower than 50,000; and iii) 
the area had a 2010 population density of lower than 80 inhabitants per square kilometer. 
According to this typology, 2,986 MCAs (70% of the total) are classified as rural, making up 
22% (41.4 million) of the national population in 2010. The rest are classified as urban. 
Data on election results for each municipality are compiled from the TSE, Tribunal 
Superior Eleitoral (TSE 2018a). Mayoral elections in Brazil are held every four years and the 
data for them have been available since 1996. We use data from the mayoral elections of 1996, 
 
2 Quality data on economic remittances by internal migrants at the local level are very difficult to 
obtain. We explored the National Consumer Expenditure Survey but found that it seriously 
underreported remittances; also, the survey is only representative at the state and metropolitan level, 




2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012, which can be matched to migration data from the 1991, 2000 and 
2010 Censuses. Municipal-level data are aggregated into MCAs by adding the total votes for 
each party in the municipalities within each MCA. We use data from the first round of elections 
when all political parties are eligible to run. Brazil adopts a majority electoral system, in which a 
candidate must win more than 50% of the votes to win. If no mayoral candidate receives more 
than 50% of the valid votes, a runoff election with the top two candidates takes place. In reality, 
very few municipalities have carried out a second round election (TSE 2018a): 31 (0.6%) in 
1996, 31 (0.6%) in 2000, 43 (0.8%) in 2004, 30 (0.5%) in 2008, and 50 (0.9%) in 2012. 
Data on migration and socioeconomic characteristics are available for three years - 1991, 
2000 and 2010 - whereas election data are available for 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012. To 
align the migration and control variables with electoral outcomes, we use piecewise linear 
interpolation (Moler 2004) to derive values in intercensal years. We use piecewise linear 
extrapolation based on the trends between 2000 and 2010 to derive values after 2010. Because 
changes in socioeconomic conditions tend to be relatively insignificant during short time periods, 
the interpolated and extrapolated values are unlikely to deviate far from what the true values are 
(Honaker and King 2010). 
We imputed all the missing electoral results data and outliers using predictive mean 
matching (PMM) (Rubin 1986). Missing electoral results occurs when the TSE nullifies a 
municipal election, after a confirmation of electoral fraud or impeachment of the candidate who 
attained a majority of the votes (TSE 2018a). Outliers may result from random fluctuation in data 
for small areas. We defined outliers as those higher than 3 interquartile ranges above the third 
quartile. Together, only a small fraction of elections (1.3%) had missing data or outliers. Details 
about PMM imputation are discussed at the bottom of Table 2. As discussed below, our main 
results are highly consistent with and without imputation. We use PMM in the main analysis 
because it provides more statistical power and mitigates micronumerosity fluctuations. 
 
Migration measures and control variables 
The Census asks all household members where they lived 5 years ago. Following the 
conventional practices of using census data, we define migrants as those aged 16 or older who 
did not live in the current MCA 5 years ago (Oliveira and Oliveira 2011). People aged 16 years 
and older are considered part of the working age population (hereby WAP) and are eligible to 
vote in Brazil. The key explanatory variable (!!") is the proportion of migrants relative to the 
WAP population (!!" =
#!"
$%&!"#$
). #!" represents the total number of out-migrants that left the $-
th MCA between year % − 5 and %. ()*!"'( is the population in i-th MCA in the year % − 5. 
Using lagged migrant flows (% − 5 to %) reduces potential reverse causality between out-
migration and electoral outcomes.  
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. On average, the percentage of out-migrants 
declined between 1991 and 2010 (from 13.0% to 8.9%), but still made up a notable share of the 
population in sending localities. About half of this flow was made up of rural-to-urban migrants. 
Appendix A displays the spatial distribution of the average share of out-migration during the 
1996-2012 period. The share of out-migrants is higher in the traditional rural areas of the 
Northeast, North, Central-West and South regions (Gori Maia and Buainain 2015). 
[Table 1 about here] 
Control variables include socioeconomic factors that have been shown to be related to 
migration and electoral outcomes (Massey and Espinosa 1997; Power and Roberts 1995). 
Economic and labor market conditions are measured by per capita income (logged), size of the 
WAP (logged), and employment rate. Education level is measured by the share of WAP with no 
education (illiterate), with some primary education (reference category), and with some 




structure (the share of WAP less than 30 years old [reference], 30 to 39 years old, 40 to 49 years 
old, 50 to 59 years old, and 60 years or older); gender (the share of the WAP who are female); 
and race (the share of the WAP who are white [reference], black, brown [pardo], and other 
races). Table 1 illustrates substantial improvements in per capita income and educational 
attainment between 1991 and 2010 although the level of socioeconomic development remains 
low.  
We also include the share of non-labor income as a proxy for public transfers, which may 
shape political behavior by increasing political participation while reducing poverty and 
vulnerability to clientelism (De La O 2013). In 2010, non-labor income represented 29% of per 
capita income in Brazil. We could not use the census data to further disaggregate different 
sources of non-labor income. Prior research suggests that non-labor income mainly consists of 
pensions, rents and dividends, and cash transfers (Barros, Carvalho, et al. 2007). 
Finally, we include the share of settled families to adjust for the political influence of the 
landless movement (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra, MST).3 The MST stages 
political mobilization that may affect the electoral preferences of local rural settlers (Navarro 
2010). Data provided by the Brazilian Institute of Land Reform (INCRA) show that nearly 
900,000 families were settled between 1988 and 2012 (INCRA 2015). In 2010, the share of 
settled families reached 2.4% of the population in sending MCAs. 
 
Measures of electoral outcomes 
Political participation 
We construct three measures of political participation: voter turnout, voter turnout adjusted by 
out-migration, and youth registration. The first indicator, voter turnout (+), is the share of 




        (1) 
where ,!" represents the number of eligible voters (age 16 or older) in the MCA	$ with a 
valid registration in the year %; and .!" is the number of registered voters who voted.  
As shown in Table 2, voter turnout has varied between 82% in 1996 and 86% in 2012. It 
was slightly lower in urban areas than in rural areas. Appendix B shows the spatial concentration 
of high turnout ratios in the poorest Northeast region. This is partly due to a combination of the 
smaller rural population size, the political mobilization of the Brazilian landless movement, and 
turnout buying. These factors are controlled for in the model.  
[Table 2 about here] 
A main limitation of + is that it does not consider the number of out-migrants who are 
registered locally but live in another municipality. By nature, + would be negatively related to 
the scale of out-migration because it captures the absence effect of migration. The potential 
positive impact of migrants' remittances would be captured by adjusting T by the number of 
voters registered in one MCA but residing in another. Although this information is not available, 
we have data for the number of justifications. Voters who fail to vote can justify their absence in 
a municipal electoral court. TSE provided the total number of justifications for each state in the 
municipal elections of 2004, 2008 and 2012 (TSE 2018a). We construct an adjusted measure 




       (2) 
 
3 INCRA (2015) provides administrative records about the number of families living on farms 
officially incorporated in the Brazilian Program of Land Reform since 1988. This information does 




where /3 is the number of justifications and #3 is the number of out-migrants in state 0. 
The justification rate 4# is a proxy for the proportion of migrants who did not vote in their place 
of origin. Since three data points are available for each state, the justification ratio	 4# represents 
the state average for the years of 2004, 2008, and 2012. The average justification ratio for all 
states is 0.65, suggesting that about two thirds of migrants justified their abstention and one third 
voted in their origin locality. This measure has some limitations because information on 
justifications is available at the state rather than the municipality level. There could be variability 
across municipalities within a state and over time that is not adequately captured by the 
justification ratio. Using PPM, we imputed 17 outliers in ++,- that result from random 
fluctuations in the data for small areas. 
As shown in Table 2, the difference between ++,- and + is within 7 percentage points. 
Both measures show a similar temporal trend. ++,- corrects for the tendency of localities with 
higher out-migration to have lower turnouts. The larger the number of out-migrants in a 
municipality, the larger the difference between ++,- and +.  
Given the limitations of ++,-, we create a third indicator measuring the participation by 
young voters, namely the youth registration ratio (1). Young people are not subject to the 




        (3) 
where ,56'57!" is the number of persons aged 16 or 17 with a valid electoral registration4 
and  *56'57!" is the total population aged 16 and 17 years in the MCA $ for year %. We imputed 
134 outliers in *56'57!" using PMM. Note that voting in Brazil is also optional for the illiterate 
and for elderly citizens 70 years or older. But the TSE does not provide accurate information on 
the number of voters in these categories. 
 
Fragmentation index 
Political competition is measured by fragmentation, or the effective number of parties running in 
each election, using the Laakso-Taagepera index (Laakso and Taagepera 1979). This index uses 
the relative number of votes received by each competing party in a community to measure the 
extent of fractionalization along party lines. It is a well-established and widely used proxy for 
measuring the degree of clientelism (Coppedge 1998). The index (2) can be interpreted in a 
meaningful way as the "effective number of parties" competing in the election. It is given by:  
2!" = 3∑ 5-!"
89
-:5 6
'5       (4) 
where	5-!" is the share of votes received by party 7 in municipality $ in year %, and 8 is the 
total number of parties in the election. The share of votes (5-) was computed as the ratio between 
the total number of votes received by party 7	and the total number of valid votes for all parties. 
The 2 index ranges from 1, when one party attains 100% of the valid votes, to 8, when all the 8 
parties attain the same share of valid votes. A larger "effective number of parties" indicates 
greater electoral competition. As shown in Table 2, 2 tends to be lower in rural areas, where 
hegemonic parties are common. 2 ranges from 1 to 8 across all MCAs over five election cycles. 
Similarly, Appendix B displays the spatial concentration of municipalities with low 
fragmentation in the poorest Northeast region. 
 
 
4 Individuals aged 16 or 17 must register in order to vote. There is no direct data on voter turnout for 
this age group. Hence, we use youth registration, which closely corresponds to actual voting behavior 





Spatial panel models 
We use spatial panel data models to examine the impact of migration on electoral outcomes in 
sending areas. One main source of bias occurs when contextual factors of the locality (e.g., poor 
socioeconomic development or democratic institutions) affect both emigration and electoral 
outcomes. Some of these factors are unobserved. Analyses that fail to account for these factors 
risk biasing the estimate of the migration effect. We first used fixed-effects (FE) to account for 
potential endogeneity bias due to time-invariant omitted variables. The Hausman test in 
Appendix C suggests that FE is preferred over random-effects models. The conventional two-
way fixed-effects model is:  
9!" = :" + <!!" + =′!"? + @! + A!"      (5) 
where 9!" represents the electoral outcome in MCA $ at time %; mit denotes the share of 
out-migrants from MCA i between time % − 5 and %; =!" is a vector of all the control variables 
presented in Table 1; :"	is the election year fixed-effects that absorb macro-level shocks that 
vary over time but are constant across the MCAs (e.g., political and macroeconomic cycles); @!   
represents the MCA fixed-effects, effectively accounting for unobservable heterogeneity that 
varies across MCAs but is constant over time; and A!" is the random disturbance term. Of 
primary interest is <- the net impact of out-migration on electoral outcomes.  
One assumption of the conventional fixed-effects model is that the units of analysis 
(MCAs) are mutually independent. But in reality, the MCAs share common boundaries. The 
political environment in one MCA may be correlated with that of the neighboring MCAs. In fact, 
the LISA (Local Indicator of Spatial Association) cluster maps (Anselin 2010) in Appendix D 
provide some evidence for the presence of local spatial association in ∆9 (∆9 = 9" − 9"';). To 
disentangle the impact of out-migration from potential spatial spillover effects, we tested several 
spatial models, which are increasingly used in studies of voting behavior (Beck 2006). We 
identified the Spatial Autocorrelation Model (SAC) (Anselin 1988; LeSage and Pace 2009) as 
the most appropriate model (Appendix C). Our main models are SAC with fixed effects, as 
specified below:  
9!" = :" + C5D!
5
E" + <!!" + =′!"? + @! + F!",  F!" = GD!5H" + A!"   (6) 
where D!5E" is the weighted average of the electoral outcome in all neighboring MCAs of 
MCA $, and D!5H" is the weighted average error in the neighboring MCAs. The vector E" 
contains electoral outcomes in all MCAs at time %, and  H" contains the errors at time %. The 
weight vector D!5 contains positive values for the five closest MCAs to MCA $, and is zero 
otherwise.5 These positive values are equal to 5,!+,
, where J!4<  is the normalized distance between 
MCA $ and 7 (J!4< = J!- ∑ J!-(-:5⁄ , where J!- is the spatial distance in km between $ and 7). The 
normalized distance is proportional to the spatial distance and ∑ J!-<(-:5 = 1. The coefficient C5 
represents the degree of spatial dependence between electoral outcomes in the origin MCA and 
its neighboring MCAs, and G is the coefficient of spatial dependence for the errors.  
Using the specification in Eq. 6, we estimate three models. Model 1 uses the total share 
of out-migrants (!) to assess the impact of out-migration on electoral outcomes (hypotheses 1 
and 2). Model 2 uses more detailed migration variables by distinguishing the share of rural-rural 
(!==), rural-urban (!=>), urban-urban (!>>), and urban-rural migrants (!>=). This model 
assesses how the impact of migration differs by the relative level of development in origin and 
 
5 The nearest neighbor strategy mitigates the effects of irregular areas (MCAs). We adopted the mode 
of contiguous neighbors in Brazil, which is five (nearly three quarters of the municipalities in Brazil 
have 5 or more neighbors). MCAs with five neighbors also exhibited the strongest levels of spatial 
autocorrelation (Appendix E). Having more than 5 neighbors tended to undermine the strength of the 




destination localities (hypothesis 3). Model 3 includes 9!"'; and the interaction between !!" and 
9!"'; (!!" × 9!"';) in Eq. 6. This model assesses how the impact of migration depends on the 
(lagged) level of political development in the origin locality (hypothesis 4). Model 1 and 2 are 
estimated using maximum likelihood. Model 3 is estimated using the generalized method of 
moments (GMM) to better account for endogeneity of the lagged outcome variable 9!"';, and its 
interaction !!" × 9!"'; (Hansen, 1982; Roodman, 2006). We use two-step system GMM 
estimators, which include lagged levels and lagged differences of regressors as instruments for 
the endogenous variables (Arellano and Bover 1995; Blundell and Bond 1998). Because the 
algorithms for GMM estimators in SAC models are not yet available, Model 3 uses only the 
spatial lag for 9 (SAR – Spatial Autoregressive Model - with GMM), which also provides 
unbiased and consistent estimates (Cizek et al. 2011). Importantly, SAR models with GMM (for 
Model 3) effectively adjust for unobserved time-variant factors and thus more rigorously account 
for potential endogeneity bias. 
 
Spatial network models 
As a strategy to identify the presence of political remittances, we assess the relationship between 
electoral outcomes in sending and receiving localities. We do so by using a spatial network 
model (based on Eq. 6). The model is given by: 




E" + =′!"? + @! + F!",  F!" = GD!5H" + A!"  (7) 
where D!"8E" is the weighted average of the electoral outcome across the destinations of 
migrants from origin MCA i at time %. The vector D!"8  contains the share of out-migrants from 
MCA $ in each destination at time %. Electoral outcomes in destinations have a greater weight if 
the destination has a higher concentration of migrants originating from MCA i. The coefficient 
C8 measures the dependence between electoral outcomes in origin and destination MCAs. A 
positive C8 lends support to the presence of political remittances (Hypothesis 5). The model is 
estimated by maximum likelihood (Belotti et al. 2013). This study is among the first to apply 
spatial network models to the examination of the impact of networks forged by migration. 
 
Results 
The impact of migration on electoral outcomes 
Table 3 presents results for various electoral outcomes: youth registration (U); turnout adjusted 
by migration (++,-); and fragmentation (2). Model 1 presents the overall net impact of migration 
(!) and Model 2 examines how the impact differs depending on the type of migration (!==, 
!=>, !>>, and !>=). Model 3 includes an interaction between migration and past electoral 
outcomes in origin (! × 9"';).  
[Table 3 about here] 
As shown in Model 1, the impact of migration on political participation is positive and 
significant at the 0.01 level. Out-migration is associated with greater youth registration and voter 
turnout (adjusted for out-migration). For each 0.1 point increase in the share of out-migrants, the 
youth participation increases by 0.014 point and the adjusted voter turnout increases by 0.041 
point. In contrast, the impact of migration on the overall unadjusted turnout rate (Appendix F) is 
negative and significant, as expected. This largely reflects the detrimental absence effect of out-
migration in the context of compulsory voting. These results are consistent with Hypothesis 1, in 
that although overall voter turnout decreases with out-migration, voter turnout among those who 
are left behind and those who are not subject to compulsory voting is higher in localities with 
more out-migration than in similar localities with less migration.  
The impact of migration on electoral competition, as measured by the fragmentation 
index, shows similar patterns to those observed for political participation. For each 0.1 point 




sending localities. These results are in line with Hypothesis 2 that out-migration is significantly 
associated with greater electoral competition in origin localities.  
Model 2 examines how the role of migration varies by the socio-political environment in 
the origin and destination areas by distinguishing different types of migration. We see that with 
respect to both electoral participation and competition, the impact of migration is particularly 
salient in the context of rural-to-urban migration compared to other types of migration. This is 
especially true when we look at youth registration and fragmentation, for which only the share of 
rural-urban migration provides the statistically significant result. These results lend some support 
to Hypothesis 3 of a particularly strong positive impact of migration when migrants move from 
less developed rural localities to more developed urban localities with more democratic 
institutions and more competitive elections. This flow generates a higher level of political and 
economic remittances to affect change in the origin localities. The pattern is less clear when it 
comes to the adjusted turnout rate. Note that for the overall turnout (Appendix F), different types 
of migration are negatively associated with the turnout rate. This most likely reflects the absence 
effect of migration in that any type of migration-related absence tends to reduce the overall 
turnout when voting is compulsory (with the exception of urban-rural migration, which is small 
in scale).  
Model 3 addresses the question of how the impact of migration depends on the level of 
political development in origin localities. Across all three outcomes, we find a negative 
interaction between the out-migration ratio and the electoral outcome (electoral participation or 
competition) in the previous election cycle. This is consistent with Hypothesis 4 that the role of 
migration is stronger in origin localities at lower levels of democratic development. It is in this 
context that political and economic remittances from migrants can shift the balance to more 
democratic attitudes and behaviors. The estimates in Model 3 are obtained through GMM 
estimators. The final number of instruments used in each model is presented at the bottom of 
Table 3 along with the Sargan’s / test statistics for the joint validity of these instruments. The 
Sargan’s / statistics in our models are all insignificant at the 5% level, suggesting that the 
instruments are exogenous and that GMM provides consistent estimates.  
The different impact of migration for different levels of political development in origin 
localities is more clearly illustrated in Figure 1, which displays the net impact of migration 
across the nine deciles of the fragmentation index (2"';). The estimated impact is the largest in 
the 1st decile (2"'; = 1.58), equaling 2.46. The impact declines in localities that have 
experienced more competitive elections and becomes insignificant at and above the 6th decile 
(2"'; = 2.72).  
[Figure 1 about here] 
All models control for spatial dependence. The Wald tests associated with the spatial 
terms (C and G) are significant across most models. This points to notable spatial dependence in 
political outcomes between origin localities and their neighboring MCAs. This could arise from 
regional strategies of political parties or could be a spillover effect of electoral behaviors in 
nearby localities.  
 
Evidence for political remittances 
Results from the spatial network models are displayed in Table 4. The explanatory variable of 
interest is (Eq. 7) the weighted average outcomes in receiving localities (D8E). 
[Table 4 about here] 
The estimate of C8 for all models is positive and significant. This means that the level of 
electoral participation and competition in a sending locality is positively associated with that 
across its receiving localities. This similarity provides some suggestive evidence for the presence 
of political remittances (Hypothesis 5): that is, the level of electoral participation and 




this analysis provides only indirect evidence, the strong observed relationship is likely to result at 
least in part from the norms and practices that migrants acquire in destinations and transmit back 
to their communities of origin.  
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
We conducted several sensitivity analyses to evaluate the robustness of the results. First, 
Appendix G compares the results of the overall impact of migration with listwise deletion 
(excluding all MCAs with any missing data or outlier on election results) and with PMM. The 
two sets of estimates are highly consistent, suggesting that the impact of out-migration is robust 
to missing data and outliers. 
Next, we explored alternative rural-urban definitions (Appendix H). T1 is based on Veiga 
(2007) and is commonly used in rural development studies in Brazil. We have adopted it in the 
main analysis. T2 is based on the density-adjusted population size proposed by IBGE (2017), 
which distinguishes rural, intermediary, and urban municipalities (details in the bottom of 
Appendix H). In general, the main findings largely hold across the two typologies. In all models, 
we see that the impact is particularly strong for rural-urban migration (5 out of 6 estimates are 
significant at the 5% level). We also identify a positive effect of rural-intermediary and 
intermediary-urban migration (T2) on youth registration and turnout. These results provide 
further support to our hypothesis that migrants from less to more developed areas have a strong 
potential to promote electoral participation. Because the results are similar, we have kept T1 for 
the main analysis for it is more parsimonious and better aligns with the timing of the study (the 
typology was developed in the 2000s, in the middle of our study period).  
Finally, to examine the change in the net impact of out-migration over time, we interacted 
the share of out-migrants with election-year dummy variables (from 1996 to 2012). Appendix I 
presents the impact of migration for each election year, which shows no clear trend over time. 
Importantly, the impact of out-migration remains strong and significant across different 
elections, especially when it comes to adjusted turnout and fragmentation. The impact of out-
migration on youth registration became insignificant during PT’s presidency (2004-2012). One 
possible explanation could be that the youngest group of voters generally became more 
politically engaged during this time period and thus became less influenced by others. This is an 
interesting question to explore for future research. 
 
Discussion 
The present study examines how internal migration shapes electoral outcomes in sending 
localities in Brazil. We compiled a longitudinal dataset on internal migration and municipal 
election outcomes, perhaps the largest currently available in Brazil. We find that out-migration - 
ceteris paribus - increases electoral participation and competition for those left behind in sending 
areas. The impact of this is especially evident in the context of rural-urban migration, where 
changes in the socioeconomic and political environment are greater more pronounced in sending 
localities characterized by low levels of democratic development. Our results also provide 
suggestive evidence of the presence of political remittances. Overall, the findings underscore the 
importance of migration for political change in sending communities. Our analysis takes into 
account potential endogeneity and spatial correlation, which increases our confidence that the 
observed effects do not result from these potential biases.  
The paper makes several contributions to existing research. First, our focus on the 
political impact of migration moves beyond the well-studied social and economic consequences 
of migration for sending areas and the often pessimistic views regarding the change induced by 
out-migration. We identify both positive and negative impacts of migration for different 
dimensions of electoral outcomes. We examine multiple measures that complement each other 




more democratic places promotes greater electoral participation and competition in local 
elections for those left behind. However, migration can also have a detrimental impact on overall 
electoral participation by reducing the number of eligible voters who are present to vote. In this 
respect, our study extends the research on the "migration-development nexus" by demonstrating 
that migration can bring not only economic and social transformation but also political change 
back home.  
In general, we join the developing body of research on "political demography." This line 
of research has postulated ways in which population dynamics shape political processes, from 
the stability of nation-states to national politics and international security (Goldstone et al. 2012). 
This conceptualization strengthens the relevance of the field of demography to politics, by 
moving beyond the conventional focus on the impact of politics on demographic outcomes to 
investigating the reverse question. There has been little systematic empirical investigation 
linking demographic forces to political affairs. The few but notable empirical studies have 
focused on the political consequences of age structure, namely "youth bulges" and population 
aging (Bhatti and Hansen 2012; Cincotta and Doces 2012). We add to this accumulating 
evidence by studying the impact of population mobility on electoral outcomes. 
 Second, the present study indicates that the role of migration is conditioned by the 
context of migration and by the level of political development in origin localities. The positive 
effect of migration on electoral outcomes is especially salient in rural-urban migration. This is 
consistent with the speculation that economic and political remittances from migrants are larger 
when there are greater differences between the origin and destination localities. Specifically, 
political remittances primarily flow from more democratic to less democratic settings. Given the 
large rural-urban gap in Brazil, urban areas are more developed socioeconomically and 
politically, resulting in greater political competition and more democratic norms. In contrast, 
citizens in less developed rural areas in Brazil have historically been more susceptible to 
clientelistic practices and experienced more hegemonic elections. Even so, their vulnerability 
seems to be alleviated to some extent by the resources generated by out-migration.  
Migration also has a more pronounced impact on electoral outcomes in localities at low 
levels of democratic development (i.e., settings that have been marked by lower electoral 
participation and competition). This is particularly important in Brazil, where elections in many 
municipalities are undermined by clientelism and low participation. We find that these 
municipalities are where migration plays the greatest role in stimulating electoral participation 
and competition. This is potentially due to migration-driven political and economic remittances, 
which heighten democratic norms and mobilize those left behind to vote based on their true 
preferences.  
Third, we provide an indirect test for the presence of political remittances using the 
spatial network model. The results highlight a strong association between electoral outcomes in 
origin and receiving localities, which provide some suggestive evidence of the transmission of 
political remittances. This finding draws parallel with the conception of "linked fate" discovered 
in African American politics (Dawson 1995). In the case of migration in Brazil, "linked fate" is 
forged between migrants and members who remain in their sending communities. Migration may 
open political spaces for migrants in destination localities, who often maintain enduring 
relationships with those left behind in sending communities. As such, migration may create a 
political linkage between destination and origin areas in ways that confer greater political 
activism on those left behind. To be sure, political remittances are not the only channel through 
which migration affects democratic development in origin localities. Economic remittances can 
also play an important role by increasing disposable income and subsequently decreasing 
clientelistic transactions. We are unable to directly test this channel because of a lack of accurate 
information on monetary remittances from internal migrants. But there are reasons to believe that 




A limitation of our study is the lack of direct measures of the underlying mechanisms that 
generate the migration effect, namely political and economic remittances. Qualitative research 
based on in-depth interviews would yield useful information about the specific ways that 
migration-driven transmission takes place and contributes to the transformation of people in 
origin areas. Nonetheless, the robustness of our results across different measures of electoral 
outcomes and different empirical strategies strengthens the central thesis of this study that 
migration can foster democratic development in sending localities, especially when it takes place 
between more and less democratic settings. A good understanding of the overall political impact 
of migration is a first step toward a deeper knowledge of these underlying mechanisms, and we 
hope this study will inspire future research to collect qualitative and quantitative data on the 
mechanisms. 
This study represents one of the first that examines the political consequences of 
migration in Brazil. The findings have some implications for understanding electoral politics in 
other developing democracies, where political actors have often relied on clientelism to build and 
maintain their power bases. This is particularly true in poor areas where a large share of voters 
depends heavily on social transfers from the government. In this context, migration can help 
undermine the hegemony of political players and reshape local power relationships by instituting 
more democratic political ideas and behaviors that are prevalent in more developed areas. This 
allows people who stay behind to defy clientelistic arrangements. As such, traditional oligarchies 
may gradually lose their ability to sustain patronage in areas characterized by large out-migration 
flows.  
The impact of migration may not be limited to electoral competition and participation. 
Political remittances may have broader consequences for democratization, including promoting 
political consciousness and non-electoral democratic participation such as protests. This 
possibility is pertinent in Brazil, where waves of protests erupted in 2016, especially in 
metropolitan areas, in response to corruption scandals and dissatisfaction with the federal 
government. These protests culminated in the impeachment of the president. In 2018, a little-
known congressman rose from obscurity and was elected as president without either the support 
of the traditional political elites or propaganda time on TV. His victory has relied almost 
exclusively on social networks and the mobilization of widespread discontent about rampant 
violence and corruption in the country. His right-wing ideas initially attracted young voters from 
the middle and upper classes in metropolitan centers. But his popularity rapidly spread to less 
developed regions. That election has underscored the importance of interpersonal channels of 
transmission in the process of political learning and influence.  
In Brazil, internal migration has remained a salient phenomenon. Migrants also have 
increasingly explored intermediary cities as destinations. Our analysis shows that migration to 
intermediary cities also generates political remittances. With the advancement of communication 
and transportation technologies, as well as the continuing flow of migration in Brazil, the 
political importance of migration may remain a reality for years to come. We find an overall 
positive impact of internal migration on electoral participation and competition in Brazil. Future 
studies can investigate how migration shapes preferences for political parties, populism, and 
polarization, all of which are areas of growing concern in Latin American countries. Although 
the study was conducted in Brazil, migration has increased worldwide. Similar questions are 
worth investigating in other societies characterized by internal and international migration from 
less to more democratic settings. The conceptual and analytic framework developed in the 
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Table 1 - Means and standard deviations (SD, in parentheses) of explanatory variables in MCA 
    1991 2000 2010 
    Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Migration       
 Share of out-migrants 0.130 (0.069) 0.114 (0.053) 0.089 (0.036) 
 Share of rural-rural migrants 0.034 (0.039) 0.031 (0.033) 0.025 (0.026) 
 Share of rural-urban migrants 0.064 (0.060) 0.060 (0.051) 0.046 (0.039) 
 Share of urban-rural migrants 0.006 (0.014) 0.006 (0.012) 0.005 (0.010) 
 Share of urban-urban migrants 0.026 (0.047) 0.027 (0.046) 0.020 (0.034) 
Economy and labor market       
 Per capita income (R$) 240 (145) 344 (197) 491 (239) 
 Working age population (1,000s) 21.6 (132.8) 27.1 (155.4) 33.6 (183.4) 
 Employment-to-population ratio 0.558 (0.070) 0.552 (0.085) 0.568 (0.092) 
Gender       
 Share of females 0.495 (0.021) 0.496 (0.018) 0.500 (0.016) 
Education       
 Share of illiterate people 0.310 (0.170) 0.216 (0.126) 0.168 (0.102) 
 Share of some primary education 0.571 (0.132) 0.576 (0.081) 0.492 (0.076) 
 
Share of some secondary education 
or more 0.119 (0.067) 0.208 (0.088) 0.341 (0.092) 
Age       
 Share of 16-29 years 0.412 (0.038) 0.377 (0.048) 0.325 (0.046) 
 Share of 30-39 years 0.205 (0.024) 0.209 (0.020) 0.194 (0.017) 
 Share of 40-49 years 0.148 (0.013) 0.158 (0.019) 0.171 (0.018) 
 Share of 50-59 years 0.106 (0.014) 0.113 (0.015) 0.129 (0.021) 
 Share of 60 years or older 0.128 (0.031) 0.143 (0.031) 0.182 (0.031) 
Race       
 Share of white 0.500 (0.278) 0.527 (0.249) 0.469 (0.234) 
 Share of black 0.052 (0.045) 0.064 (0.048) 0.070 (0.052) 
 Share of brown 0.440 (0.267) 0.396 (0.228) 0.446 (0.207) 
 Share of others 0.007 (0.024) 0.014 (0.026) 0.015 (0.032) 
Public Transfer       
 Share of non-labor income 0.112 (0.051) 0.222 (0.085) 0.288 (0.102) 
Political Mobilization       
  Share of settled families 0.002 (0.020) 0.016 (0.060) 0.024 (0.072) 





Table 2 – Mean and standard deviation (SD, in parentheses) for electoral outcomes in MCAs 
Election 
Listwise Deletion PMM Imputation 
Rural Urban Rural Urban 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Youth Registration (1) 
1996 0.594 (0.206) 0.430 (0.181) 0.596 (0.207) 0.431 (0.182) 
2000 0.734 (0.214) 0.533 (0.206) 0.738 (0.219) 0.533 (0.206) 
2004 0.800 (0.215) 0.607 (0.204) 0.805 (0.221) 0.608 (0.205) 
2008 0.731 (0.223) 0.521 (0.222) 0.734 (0.226) 0.521 (0.222) 
2012 0.781 (0.271) 0.548 (0.254) 0.787 (0.276) 0.549 (0.255) 
         
Turnout adjusted by migration (++,-) 
1996 0.887 (0.089) 0.879 (0.077) 0.888 (0.090) 0.882 (0.083) 
2000 0.941 (0.083) 0.919 (0.063) 0.942 (0.084) 0.919 (0.064) 
2004 0.950 (0.068) 0.923 (0.050) 0.950 (0.068) 0.923 (0.050) 
2008 0.950 (0.065) 0.917 (0.049) 0.950 (0.065) 0.917 (0.049) 
2012 0.914 (0.060) 0.897 (0.049) 0.914 (0.060) 0.897 (0.050) 
         
Turnout (+) 
1996 0.817 (0.080) 0.837 (0.336) 0.818 (0.081) 0.861 (0.488) 
2000 0.867 (0.068) 0.858 (0.058) 0.867 (0.068) 0.858 (0.058) 
2004 0.882 (0.058) 0.868 (0.045) 0.882 (0.058) 0.868 (0.045) 
2008 0.887 (0.055) 0.867 (0.044) 0.887 (0.055) 0.867 (0.044) 
2012 0.861 (0.055) 0.852 (0.047) 0.861 (0.055) 0.852 (0.047) 
         
Fragmentation (2) 
1996 2.370 (0.835) 2.756 (0.989) 2.376 (0.839) 2.761 (0.992) 
2000 2.534 (0.889) 2.857 (1.094) 2.534 (0.890) 2.857 (1.097) 
2004 2.500 (0.917) 2.892 (1.110) 2.502 (0.916) 2.890 (1.111) 
2008 2.460 (0.947) 2.854 (1.132) 2.458 (0.948) 2.854 (1.131) 
2012 2.238 (0.673) 2.593 (0.974) 2.238 (0.673) 2.592 (0.973) 
Note: Listwise deletion excludes missing values or outliers. PMM Imputation replaces missing data and 
outliers with a randomly selected imputed value from the 5 elections with the closest observable 
characteristics. Observable characteristics included in the imputation are non-missing lagged (! − #) and 
forwarded (! + #) values of all electoral results, log of per capita income, log of WAP, employment-to-
population ratio, share of female WAP, share of WAP by education, share of WAP by age, share of WAP 





Table 3 - Estimates of the impact of migration on electoral outcomes based on spatial panel data models 
  Youth Registration (!) Turnout adjusted ("!"#) Fragmentation (#) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Share of migrants ($) 0.137***  1.140*** 0.409***  2.017*** 0.763***  4.701*** 
 (0.034)  (0.275) (0.012)  (0.639) (0.210)  (1.217) 
Share of rural-rural ($$$)  0.138   0.371***   0.147  
  (0.079)   (0.028)   (0.516)  
Share of rural-urban ($$%)  0.141***   0.431***   1.001***  
  (0.046)   (0.017)   (0.297)  
Share of urban-urban ($%%)  0.108   0.355***   0.645  
  (0.089)   (0.033)   (0.545)  
Share of urban-rural ($%$)  0.299   0.533***   1.585  
  (0.275)   (0.099)   (1.853)  
%&'(	   0.451***   0.762***   0.161*** 
   (0.161)   (0.150)   (0.043) 
$ × %&'(	   -1.653***   -1.635*   -1.425*** 
   (0.405)   (0.685)   (0.391) 
          
Wald test (( = 0) 607.4*** 603.5*** 93.0*** 1,384*** 1,380*** 356.9*** 355.5*** 354.7*** 123.3*** 
Wald test (+ = 0) 2,574*** 2,555***  13,927*** 13,877***  139.9*** 139.6***  
          
,)	 0.727 0.727 0.632 0.552 0.599 0.284 0.418 0.418 0.139 
-	 4,267 4,267 4,267 4,267 4,267 4,267 4,267 4,267 4,267 
.	 5 5 4 5 5 4 5 5 4 
Number of instruments   26   26   31 
Hansen / statistic     4.18     4.86     16.64 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. SAC with fixed effects in Model 1 and 2. SAR with two-step system GMM estimates in Model 3. All models include controls for log of per 
capita income, log of WAP, employment-to-population ratio, share of female WAP, share of WAP by education, share of WAP by age, share of WAP by race, share of 













Avg. Y destination ($$%) 0.450*** 0.266*** 0.199*** 
 (0.015) (0.011) (0.012) 
    
Wald test (& = 0) 2,004*** 7,217*** 918.4*** 
Wald test () = 0) 875.4*** 1,435*** 492.6*** 
    
*%	 0.707 0.472 0.417 
,	 4,267 4,267 4,267 
-	 5 5 5 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. SAC with fixed effects. All models include controls for log of per capita 
income, log of WAP, employment-to-population ratio, share of female WAP, share of WAP by education, 
share of WAP by age, share of WAP by race, share of non-labor income, share of settled families, and 




Figure 1 - The impact of migration (.) on fragmentation (#&) and 95% confidence interval, by 
deciles of #&'(   
 
 






Appendix A - Average of the share of out-migrants, 1996-2012 
 
 
Source: Demographic Census, 1991, 2000 and 2010 
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Appendix B - Average youth registration rate, turnout rate (adjusted), turnout rate, and 
fragmentation, 1996-2012  
 
Youth Registration (!) 
 
 









Source: Tribunal Superior Eleitoral,1996, 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012 
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Appendix C – Model specification tests for fixed versus random effects (Hausman) and for 






adjusted       
(Tadj) 




Hausman test  848.1*** 369.2*** 112.8*** 158.3*** 
LR test (& = 0), SAR 638.9*** 2740.7*** 45.8*** 138.4*** 
LR test () = 0), SEM 668.1*** 2807.3*** 38.3*** 133.8*** 
LR test (& = 0, ) = 0), SAC 925.2*** 3492.9*** 45.8*** 193.8*** 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. The Hausman test compares Model 1 using fixed effects and random effects 




Appendix D – LISA clusters for the average difference (Δ or Diff) of the youth registration, 
turnout adjusted, turnout and fragmentation  
 
Youth Registration (Δ!) 
 
 








Note: The LISA cluster map classifies the significant ($ < 0.05) patterns of spatial association into four 
groups (Anselin 2010): high-high (MCAs with high value of ∆*, average difference between 1996 and 
2012, surrounded by MCAs with high values of ∆*); high-low; low-low; and low-high.  
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5-NN 8-NN 10-NN 
I SD I SD I SD 
Youth Registration (U)     
1996 0.264 (0.010) 0.253 (0.008) 0.246 (0.007) 
2000 0.261 (0.010) 0.251 (0.008) 0.244 (0.007) 
2004 0.306 (0.010) 0.296 (0.008) 0.290 (0.007) 
2008 0.306 (0.010) 0.295 (0.008) 0.288 (0.007) 
2012 0.318 (0.010) 0.312 (0.008) 0.307 (0.007) 
       
Turnout adjusted by migration (Tadj)   
1996 0.307 (0.009) 0.299 (0.007) 0.297 (0.007) 
2000 0.442 (0.010) 0.428 (0.008) 0.421 (0.007) 
2004 0.395 (0.010) 0.379 (0.008) 0.369 (0.007) 
2008 0.352 (0.010) 0.337 (0.008) 0.328 (0.007) 
2012 0.404 (0.010) 0.386 (0.008) 0.377 (0.007) 
       
Turnout (T)      
1996 0.107 (0.008) 0.105 (0.007) 0.105 (0.006) 
2000 0.530 (0.010) 0.517 (0.008) 0.510 (0.007) 
2004 0.447 (0.010) 0.433 (0.008) 0.424 (0.007) 
2008 0.379 (0.010) 0.362 (0.008) 0.354 (0.007) 
2012 0.520 (0.010) 0.499 (0.008) 0.488 (0.007) 
       
Fragmentation (F)     
1996 0.179 (0.010) 0.173 (0.008) 0.170 (0.007) 
2000 0.108 (0.010) 0.102 (0.008) 0.102 (0.007) 
2004 0.093 (0.010) 0.092 (0.008) 0.092 (0.007) 
2008 0.098 (0.010) 0.091 (0.008) 0.088 (0.007) 
2012 0.147 (0.010) 0.141 (0.008) 0.139 (0.007) 
Note: All estimates are significant at 0.05%. 
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Appendix F - Estimates of the impact of migration on voter turnout (unadjusted) based on spatial panel 
data models  
  Turnout (T) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Share of migrants (.) -0.168***  -0.720** 
 (0.037)  (0.231) 
Share of rural-rural (.)))  -0.216*  
  (0.090)  
Share of rural-urban (.)*)  -0.175***  
  (0.052)  
Share of urban-urban (.**)  0.066  
  (0.098)  
Share of urban-rural (.*))  -0.695*  
  (0.320)  
2&'(	   -0.095* 
   (0.043) 
. × 2&'(	   0.816** 
   (0.280) 
    
Wald test (& = 0) 7.9**** 7.7** 2,176*** 
Wald test () = 0) 0.0 0.0  
    
*%	 0.317 0.317 0.515 
,	 4,267 4,267 4,267 
-	 5 5 4 
Number of instruments   23 
Hansen 4 statistic     3.86 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. SAC with fixed effects in Model 1 and 2. SAR with a two-step system 
GMM estimates are in Model 3. All models include controls for log of per capita income, log of WAP, 
employment-to-population ratio, share of female WAP, share of WAP by education, share of WAP by 





Appendix G - Estimates of the impact of migration on electoral outcomes for Model 1 using listwise 
deletion and PMM imputation 
  Youth Registration Turnout adjusted Fragmentation 











Share migrants (.) 0.165*** 0.137*** 0.404*** 0.409*** 0.816*** 0.763*** 
 (0.035) (0.034) (0.012) (0.012) (0.216) (0.210) 
       
n 4,083 4,267 4,083 4,267 4,083 4,267 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. All models are based on SAC with fixed effects and control for log of per 
capita income, log of WAP, employment-to-population ratio, share of female WAP, share of WAP by 
education, share of WAP by age, share of WAP by race, share of non-labor income, share of settled 
families, and year dummy variables. Listwise deletion excludes MCAs with any missing values or 
outliers. PMM Imputation replaces the missing data and outliers with a randomly selected imputed values 
from the 5 elections with the closest observable characteristics.
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Appendix H - Estimates of the impact of migration on electoral outcomes for Model 1 using two different rural vs. urban typologies 
Type of Migration Flow Youth Registration Turnout adjusted Fragmentation 
T1 T2 T1 T2 T1 T2 
Share of rural-rural 0.138 -0.349* 0.371*** 0.429*** 0.147 0.393 
 (0.079) (0.147) (0.028) (0.056) (0.516) (0.989) 
Share of rural-intermediary  0.599***  0.211**  0.269 
  (0.188)  (0.072)  (1.268) 
Share of rural-urban 0.141*** 0.078 0.431*** 0.401*** 1.001*** 0.930** 
 (0.046) (0.051) (0.017) (0.019) (0.297) (0.341) 
Share of intermediary-rural  0.6796  0.533***  1.068 
  (0.353)  (0.135)  (2.383) 
Share of intermediary-intermediary  -0.717  -0.259  -2.851 
  (0.400)  (0.153)  (2.698) 
Share of intermediary-urban  0.528***  0.303***  0.63 
  (0.097)  (0.037)  (0.654) 
Share of urban-rural 0.299 1.317** 0.533*** 0.445** 1.585 2.138 
 (0.275) (0.431) (0.099) (0.164) (1.853) (2.907) 
Share of urban-intermediary  0.587  -0.087  0.839 
  (0.523)  (0.200)  (3.529) 
Share of urban-urban 0.108 0.467*** 0.355*** 0.464*** 0.645 1.692* 
  (0.089) (0.099) (0.033) (0.038) (0.545) (0.671) 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. All models are based on SAC with fixed effects and control for log of per capita income, log of WAP, employment-to-population 
ratio, share of female WAP, share of WAP by education, share of WAP by age, share of WAP by race, share of non-labor income, share of settled families, and 
year dummy variables. T1 is based on Veiga (2007), currently adopted in the main analysis. T2 is based on population density proposed by IBGE (2017). T2 uses 
the total population living in dense areas and the share of the total population living in dense areas within each municipality. Dense areas are defined as those with 
a population density above 300 inhabitants/km2 and a total surrounding population (sum of its population and the eight closest contiguous areas) greater than or 






Appendix I - Estimates of the impact of migration by election year 
 Youth Registration 
Turnout   
Adjusted Fragmentation 
Share of out-migrants in 1996 0.215*** 0.218*** 0.575* 
 (0.041) (0.016) (0.277) 
Share of out-migrants in 2000 0.301*** 0.465*** 1.127*** 
 (0.043) (0.016) (0.287) 
Share of out-migrants in 2004 0.098 0.538*** 0.798* 
 (0.054) (0.020) (0.362) 
Share of out-migrants in 2008 0.070 0.656*** 1.498*** 
 (0.061) (0.023) (0.411) 
Share of out-migrants in 2012 0.053 0.550*** 1.152** 
  (0.056) (0.021) (0.380) 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. All models are based on SAR with fixed effects, and control for log of 
per capita income, log of WAP, employment-to-population ratio, share of female WAP, share of WAP by 
education, share of WAP by age, share of WAP by race, share of non-labor income, share of settled 
families, and year dummy variables. 
 
 
 
